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Book Review
Homosexuals, Torts, and Dangerous Things
Cases and Materials on Sexual Orientation and the Law. By William B.
Rubenstein.* St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 2d ed. 1997. Pp. xlv, 922.
$54.00.
Sexuality, Gender, and the Law. By William N. Eskridge, Jr." and Nan D.
Hunter.- Westbury, N.Y: Foundation Press, 1997. Pp. xlviii, 1185.
Katherine M. Franket
Negligent, intentional, and strict liability torts. From a canonical
standpoint, whatever else one might teach, it is not a first-year torts course if
these three concepts are not covered. Torts has a canon, even a Restatement.,
Yet a canon evolves only after some criteria of value has been established such
that privileged texts can be identified according to some authoritative standard.
In other words, a canon is the result of a process by which a rule of
recognition identifies authoritative texts.
At what point can we say that torts became a field and an intact legal
subject, the canon of which could be taught in law schools? Most often,
casebooks reveal an existing canon, as is the case with most contemporary
torts texts. However, during a period of field formation or reformation,
casebooks can play a critical role in the evolution of a field, the creation of a
disciplinary rule of recognition, and the concomitant development of a canon.
Two new casebooks, William Rubenstein's Cases and Materials on Sexual
* Acting Associate Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
*** Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. Thts Book Review was
significantly enriched by conversations with Mary Becker, Paula Ettelbrick. Janet Halley. Quince Hopkins.
Janet Jakobson, Miranda Joseph, Carol Rose, and Ted Schneyer. I particularly benefitted from Dan Dobbs's
patient visits to my office to discuss the history and structure of tort law.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
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Orientation and the Law2 and William Eskridge and Nan Hunter's Sexuality,
Gender, and the Law,3 enter legal education at a moment when they can have
a profound effect upon the formation of a law school subject, a legal field, and
a canon. What is, or should be considered, the canon of the field alternatively
termed gay/lesbian, sexual orientation, sexuality, or queer law? What should
we teach? If a canon is ."a historical, political, and social product, something
that is fashioned by men and women in the name of certain interests, partisan
concerns, and social and political agenda,"'" then these books reflect two
competing social and political agendas.
I. CANON FORMATION IN TORTS:
THE PERSUASIVE POWER OF ONE CONCEPTUAL SCHEME
In a well-established field such as torts, contemporary law school texts
reveal to students an existing canon.5 But a century ago, the struggle to define
a coherent subject called torts was being waged within the academy and the
larger legal community. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the American
legal system approached the problem of personal injuries by resort to common
law writs of Trespass and Case.6 While eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
lawyers knew there was a distinction between these two forms of action, few
could have elaborated just what that distinction was:
It was certain there was a distinction [between trespass and case] even
if nobody knew what it was .... The law itself was seen as based,
not upon elementary ideas, but upon the common law writs, as
consisting in a range of remedies which had as it were come down
from the skies. If a case fell within the scope of no writ, then in
general there was no law. If it fell within the scope of one writ, then
in general no other writ could be proper.7
In 1870, C.G. Addison published one of the first treatises on torts, in
which he catalogued various common law forms of action but did not provide
an overarching theory of torts.' In fact, Addison's timing was rather
2. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (2d
ed. 1997).
3. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDOE, JR. & NAN HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW (1997). Because
this book had not been published when this Review went to press, page references are based on proofs.
4. Canon Busting: The Basic Issues-An Interview with Stanley Fish, NAT'L F.: PHI KAPPA PHI J.,
Summer 1989, at 13, 13 (quoting Stanley Fish).
5. See, e.g., DAN DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1993); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS (5th ed. 1990).
6. The writ of Trespass provided relief for injuries, usually between strangers, that were the result of
direct and immediate harm from the unauthorized use of physical force, whereas actions on the Case were
appropriate for harms inflicted between parties who had a relationship of either contract or status. See
S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 393 (2d ed. 1981).
7. Id. at 309.
8. See C.G. ADDISON, THE LAW OF TORTS (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1870).
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unfortunate, as he published the treatise at a time when the formal English writ
system was losing favor in U.S. courts.9 As a result, the book was not well
received. An unsigned review, widely attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes,"0
made a damning observation about Addison's book: "We are inclined to think
that Torts is not a proper subject for a law book."" Between the lines of the
review lay the judgment that the field of torts, such as it was in 1870 and such
as it was captured in Addison's treatise, was merely an amalgam of procedural
forms of action, rather than a coherent and unified system by which "to fix the
dividing lines between those cases in which a man is liable for harm which he
has done, and those in which he is not." 
1 2
Addison's treatise had been reviewed in no small measure because Harvard
Law School had determined to teach torts as a separate law school subject in
1870 and it was regarded as the work best adapted for a textbook. 3 Sensing
that the time might be right for a new field to emerge, but in a form that
provided overriding philosophical and theoretical principles, the reviewer ended
with the following entreaty: "We long for the day when we may see these
subjects treated by a writer capable of dealing with them philosophically, and
self-sacrificing enough to write a treatise as if it were an integral part of a
commentary on the entire body of the law."' 4
That day was not long in coming. A second anonymous essay, again
widely attributed to Holmes, 5 appeared in the American Law Review under
the title, The Theory of Torts. 6 In this essay, the author outlined a tripartite
conception of torts: liabilities in which culpability is in general an essential
element (negligent torts); liabilities irrespective of culpability (strict liability
torts); and liabilities arising from acts done intentionally (intentional torts). 17
Holmes would go on to develop more fully his metatheory of torts in The
Common Law in 1881.8 His project was "to discover whether there is any
common ground at the bottom of all liability in tort, and if so, what that
ground is."' 9 He concluded that "[s]uch a theory is very hard to find. The law
did not begin with a theory. It has never worked one out."'' As such, the task
9. The emergence of the Field Code in 1848 is one example of this trend See LAWRENC M
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMiERICAN LAW 391-94, 403-06 (2d ed 1985)
10. See G. EDWARD WHIrr, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN 1NTELLECTUAL HISTORY 12 (1980)
11. Book Notice, 5 AM. L. REV. 340, 341 (1871) (reviewing ADDISO,,. supra note 8)
12. O.W. HoLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAW 79 (Boston, Little. Brown. & Co 1881)
13. See Book Notice, supra note 11, at 340.
14. Id. at 341.
15. See, e.g., WHrTE, supra note 10, at 12.
16. The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652 (1873). Compare the implicit confidence displayed by
Holmes's use of the word "the" in the article's title with the humility of the indefinite artsicle used by John
Rawls, certainly a no less important legal philosopher, in the title of his germinal work See JottN RAWLS.
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
17. See The Theory of Torts, supra note 16, at 653.
18. HOLMES, supra note 12.
19. Id. at 77.
20. Id.
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fell to him to develop one. In so doing, Holmes located his conception of tort
liability within a larger modernist discourse of human agency. Rather than
relying upon arcane forms of action that organized wrongs by reference to the
nature of the injury alleged, Holmes's theory was animated by a universal
moral agent, the reasonable or prudent man: "The ideal average prudent
man... is a constant, and his conduct under given circumstances is
theoretically always the same."2
In 1874, convinced of the soundness of the case method recently
introduced to Harvard Law School by Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell,
Professor James Barr Ames published for his Harvard students the first torts
casebook.22 In this text, Ames did not heed the call to theory provided by
Holmes, but rather offered his students 800 pages covering the common law
forms of action for trespass, case, conversion, and defamation. Ames's book
contained not one negligence case.23 In 1893, however, the second edition of
the book devoted "six chapters to negligence, including discussions of
standards of care, the concept of duty, and contributory negligence."' From
that time forward, Holmes's theoretical framework has defined the field by
locating the reasonable person at the center of a tripartite system of civil
liability. Within this structure, a canon of tort law has evolved, and
contemporary torts casebooks invariably include canonical cases, such as The
T.J. Hooper,25 United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 26 Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Co.,27 and Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.21
The process by which torts emerged as the field we know today mirrored
a larger process taking place in American jurisprudence during the latter half
of the nineteenth century: the maturation of a distinctly American legal system.
The movement away from the English common law writ system, and toward
a new conceptual scheme based on fault, individual responsibility, and the
emergence of generalized standards of care, was provoked in significant part
by the writings of Holmes. But it also reflected a response to changes in the
U.S. economy, most notably the emergence of national railroads, large mills,
and industrialized factories producing numerous accidents between strangers. 9
A new theory of civil liability was necessary to respond adequately to a newly
21. Id. at 111.
22. See JAMES BARR AMES, SELECT CASES ON TORTS (Cambridge, Mass., n.pub. 1874).
23. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 18.
24. Id. at 18-19. Ames's colleague Jeremiah Smith authored these six chapters as part of a supplement
to the original work. See id.
25. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (considering industry custom in establishing standards of care in
negligence cases).
26. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (establishing risk-utility rule in negligence cases).
27. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (establishing "risk rule" approach to limiting tort liability).
28. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (applying doctrine of res ipse loquitur to injuries sustained from
defective product).
29. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 468; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION Op AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860, at 95 (1977).
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industrialized United States. Thus the canonical cases of tort law came to enjoy
a privileged status according to criteria of value that reflected particular
historical, social, and political agendas.
In Doing What Comes Naturally, Stanley Fish observed that a powerful
critic "can have a profound and direct effect on what gets taught in the
schools, what appears in the curriculum, what gains entrance into the canon,
what gets published, reviewed, anthologized, disseminated."' 3 If ever this
observation were true, it would be with respect to Holmes's theory of torts.
With his general theory, Holmes created the field known as torts, shaped the
curriculum of law school torts classes, and mapped out the contours of our
contemporary torts canon. In the years since The Common Law, other torts
theorists have tried to introduce new or alternative paradigms for
conceptualizing the field of torts,3 but with the exception of Guido
Calabresi's introduction of law and economics,32 the inertia of Holmes's
model has been too powerful to resist.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF A NEW FIELD:
SEXUAL ORIENTATION/SExuALrrY AND THE LAW
The two new casebooks I review here appear at a critical point in the
maturing of the gay rights movement and as a distinctly gay, some might say
queer, American jurisprudence begins to emerge. Gay men and lesbians have
just been found to have the right to marry under the Hawaii Constitution,3
and the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that the Colorado Constitution
cannot legitimately serve as the vehicle for the majority of Colorado citizens
to express raw prejudice against gay people.3' Both of these casebooks are
clear, well-organized, and will teach very well. They will provide students with
both doctrinal and theoretical grounding in areas of law and policy not
typically covered in law school curricula. My goal in this Book Review is to
locate the texts within an emerging legal field, and within gay and lesbian
theory more generally. The choice to use one book over the other will derive
not from any particular weaknesses in either, but from a view of what is the
proper object of this subject.
When I was in law school in 1983, classes on sexual orientation and the
law or sexuality and the law were not offered at my or any other law school.
30. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT CONES NATURALLY 306 (1989).
31. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES (1931). Dean Green suggested a
conceptual scheme with which to approach tort law grounded in kinds of harms, rather than kinds of duues.
As such, he organized the field into categories such as "Threats. Insults, Blows. Attacks, Wounds. Fights.
Restraints," "Surgical Operations," "Keeping of Animals," and "Power, Telephone and Telegraph. Water.
and Gas Companies." Id. at ix. Green's casebook was never widely adopted.
32. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
33. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV No. 91-1394. 1996 WL 694235. at "22 (Haw. Ctr. Ci. Dec. 3, 1996).
34. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996).
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I and my fellow lesbian and gay law students, however, wanted to educate
ourselves about gay rights law; some of us wanted to practice in this area,
others were merely curious, and all of us felt the weight of our invisibility in
the law school curriculum. This desire motivated us to put together our own
self-taught course; certainly no one on the faculty had any greater expertise in
the matter. We went to the library and found a few reported decisions that
dealt with the rights of lesbians and gay men: a handful of employment
cases,35 a few lesbian custody cases, 36 cases concerning gay and lesbian
student groups that had been denied official university recognition,37 and a
few sodomy cases. 8 We created an independent study course, and taught the
material to ourselves. At that point in my life, no text revealed an overarching
theory of sexual orientation or sexuality and the law. 39 As a result, not unlike
C.G. Addison, we merely assembled existing reported decisions according to
the type of harm alleged: employment discrimination, sodomy prosecutions,
school recognition, child custody, and others. We shared with many gay rights
advocates and scholars of the time a pre-Hardwick innocence grounded in the
firmly held belief that soon the Supreme Court would dignify our lives by
recognizing a right to privacy for consensual adult same-sex sexuality. Surely
the judicial assault on our families, relationships, and public lives could not
continue much longer.
Things have come a long way in the intervening fourteen years. While
many commentators might have denied in 1983 that sexuality and the law was
a legal field, few contemporary reviewers would maintain that "sexual
orientation and the law" or "sexuality and the law" are not proper subjects for
a casebook today. Unlike Ames's casebook on torts, the Eskridge-Hunter and
Rubenstein casebooks have emerged not at the pedagogical moment when
Harvard Law School determined to teach a course in sexual orientation and the
law,40 but after many American law schools have deemed this subject
important enough to include it in their curricula. Indeed, as of 1995, one
quarter of American law schools were offering courses devoted primarily to
35. See, e.g., Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980); Singer v. United States Civ. Scrv.
Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Gay Law
Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
36. See, e.g., S v. S, 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D.
1981).
37. See, e.g., Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977).
38. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975); People v. Onofre,
415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980).
39. In 1985, Roberta Achtenberg, then Directing Attorney at the National Center for Lesbian Rights,
edited a treatise on sexual orientation and the law that employed the Addisonesque approach of cataloguing
the material. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (Roberta Achtenberg ed., 1985). It was merely a
more comprehensive compilation of cases than we were able to assemble as second-year law students.
40. Harvard Law School has included courses such as "Sexual Orientation and the Law" and "Law,
Sex, and Identity" in its curriculum for several years now, all of which have been taught, however, by
adjunct or visiting professors (including Bill Rubenstein).
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sexuality and/or sexual orientation,4 and the percentage increases to one third
if one counts courses that provide some significant or substantial coverage of
these issues. 2 But what is being taught in these courses? 3 What is the
proper subject of these courses and of these casebooks? What would a
sophisticated and philosophic "commentary on the entire body of the law" u
in this area look like? Would it promise "a 'critical' intellectual domain in
American legal jurisprudence," '45 or just a compilation of historic wrongs
done to gay men and lesbians?
A survey of the syllabi used in the forty-eight law school courses devoted
primarily to sexuality and/or sexual orientation and the law indicates highly
idiosyncratic responses to the question of what to teach.' Some professors,
in effect, ask the "gay question," just as many teachers of "Women and the
Law" courses ask the "woman question" '7 and many teachers of "Race,
Racism, and the Law" ask the "race question":' They seek to analyze the
law's effect on gay men and lesbians as a class. Presupposing a fully
constituted homosexual subject who is regulated by legal norms and rules,
these courses examine the ways in which lesbians and gay men are treated or
mistreated by the state through the enforcement of sodomy laws, denial of
child custody, expulsion from the military, and limitations on the right to
marry. Grounded in an acceptance of identity politics as the foundation of
equality claims, this approach to the subject of sexual orientation and the law
most often regards the aim of the struggle for gay rights as securing suspect
class status for gay men and lesbians.
In contrast, others approach this subject by considering the ways in which
gay men and lesbians are not the object, but the effect of legal regulation. On
41. See Francisco Valdes, Tracking and Assessing the (Non)lnclusion of Courses on Sexuahty and/or
Sexual Orientation in the American Law School Curriculim: Reports from the Field After a Decade of
Effort, I NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 150, 151 (1995) <http:llsunsite unce dulgaylaw/filesi
valdes2.pag>.
42. An example of the latter is "AIDS and the Law." See id. Of course, these numbers reveal that the
majority of law schools do not offer courses on sexuality or sexual onentation law This fact can be
explained in several ways, the most generous of which is that these courses, like -Feminist Jurisprudence'"
and "Critical Race Theory," tend to be offered with greater frequency at the more elite schools that feel
they have more freedom to offer non-black letter, jurisprudential courses.
43. The first edition of Rubenstein's book. WtLII B. RUBENSTEIN. LESBIANS. GAY MEN. AND THE
LAW (1993), was adopted for use in roughly 25 to 30 classes, including non-law school courses on the
rights of gay men and lesbians.
44. Book Notice, supra note 11. at 341.
45. Victor F. Caldwell, Book Note, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1363. 1363 (1996) (reviewing CRItmCAL RACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORiED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Williams Crenshaw ct al cds.
1995)).
46. See Valdes, supra note 41.
47. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Htv. L. RE-:v 829. 837 (1990) ('[Tlhe
woman question' . .. is designed to identify the gender implications of rules and practices wuch might
otherwise appear to be neutral or objective.") (footnote omitted); Patricia A. Cain. Feminist Legal
Scholarship, 77 IowA L. REv. 19, 20 (1991) ("Feminist legal scholarship seeks to analyze the law's effect
on women as a class.").
48. See, e.g., PATRIcIA WILLtAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)
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this view, a course entitled "Sexual Orientation and the Law" is not about gay
men and lesbians, but about the role that law plays in giving the notion of
sexual orientation meaning-whether it be heterosexuality, homosexuality, or
bisexuality.49 For instance, Jane Schacter has taught a course at the University
of Wisconsin Law School that "examine[s] the relationship between sexual
orientation and the law."' The course focused "on the interaction between
the law and social, cultural and political attitudes about sexual
orientation-that is, how social forces shape, and are shaped by, legal
doctrine."'" There are also those who approach this subject with their own
particular intersectional interests. For instance, Mary Becker teaches a course
at the University of Chicago entitled "Critical Race and Lesbian-Gay Legal
Theory," while Twila Perry teaches "Race, Gender, and Torts" at Rutgers
University-Newark.
Given that the question-"What is the proper subject of sexual orientation
and the law?"-provokes as many different answers as there are courses so
named, is this the proper topic for a casebook? Can we even begin to call such
a diverse constellation of material a field? Just as Holmes provided the
philosophical framework within which to understand torts as a field, Eskridge-
Hunter and Rubenstein provide frames to approach the subject of
sexuality/sexual orientation. These two books, while providing very different
views on the subject they purport to present, will have profound effects upon
the evolution of sexual orientation, or queer theory, and the law. My hope,
however, is that the effect these two new casebooks will have on this field will
differ significantly from the effect Holmes's metatheory had on the creation
of the law of torts: No winner will emerge who, by virtue of winning,
marginalizes the loser as naive, outdated, or irrelevant. Both of these books
should receive equal respect in the academy, for they will keep alive an
ongoing dynamic debate within the lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender/queer
communities with respect to the nature of sexuality, sexual identity, and the
law. About this, I will have more to say later.52
III. RUBENSTEIN'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW
Rubenstein's text is the second edition of a book he published under a
different title in 1993. When Jane Schacter reviewed the first edition, she
49. At a 1996 American Association of Law Schools' conference in Washington, D.C. on lesbians and
gay men in law teaching, Nan Hunter suggested that the attendees consider teaching a course entitled
"Heterosexuality and the Law" as a way of unmasking the powerful normative priority of heterosexuality.
50. Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation and the Law 1 (Spring 1994) (syllabus, on file with author).
51. Id.
52. See infra Part V.
53. See RuBENsTmIN, supra note 43.
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wrote that "[i]f timing is everything, then Bill Rubenstein got it just right."' '
He still does. This is a very good book. Indeed, it is a better book than the
first edition because Rubenstein took to heart virtually all of Schacter's
criticisms of the first edition." In Cases and Materials on Sexual Orientation
and the Law, Rubenstein essentially asks the "gay question." About this
perspective he is quite up-front. In the preface to the second edition he
recounts the problems he had while a student at Harvard Law School searching
for himself-a gay man-in the law school curriculum, in Harvard's well-
stocked library, and in legal literature generally: "In the vast majestic expanse
of Harvard Law School's library-where no subject was too obscure for its
own shelf-the absence of legal materials about my life was itself awe-
inspiring."56
This identity statement frames Rubenstein's text: It is a book for and about
gay men and lesbians. Should non-gay people choose to take, or even teach,
a class on the subject, they are welcome. Yet the fundamental "aspects of gay
and lesbian lives' 57 is what this book is about, a subject for which many
students and teachers are looking. With the exception of sodomy and
solicitation cases in criminal law and a few recent constitutional law cases, gay
men and lesbians remain invisible in courses other than those that are explicitly
dedicated to sexual orientation and the law. Until recently, traditional law
school courses likewise ignored women's lives completely, yet to varying
degrees women now appear in the cases and problems that are used in
mainstream casebooks. If it were not for courses dedicated to sexual
orientation, gay men and lesbians would still be wandering the halls of their
law schools hopelessly looking for themselves in the curriculum, just as
Rubenstein and I did during the early to mid-1980s.
The Rubenstein book begins with a chapter he titles "Basic Documents,"
which is divided into six subjects: Sexuality, Identity/History, Religion,
Psychiatry, Philosophy, and Queer Theory. What makes these documents
"Basic" is not entirely obvious; I wondered, "basic to what?" or "to whom?"
Certainly Rubenstein is trying to set a cultural stage for the legal materials that
54. Jane S. Schacter, Poised at the Threshold: Sexual Orientation. Law and the Law School
Curriculum in the Nineties, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1910, 1910 (1994) (book review) (footnote omitted).
55. For instance, Schacter suggested that "the chapter on regulation of sexual activity would have been
enriched by readings exploring and critiquing the premises of liberal privacy theory." Id. at 192 1. The new
text includes excerpts of writings on privacy theory by Michael Sandel. Jed Rubenfeld. Kendall Thomas,
and Andrew Koppelman. See RuBENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 265-80. Similarly. Schacter felt that the book
needed more "readings from social and legal theory that engage the large and overarching questions"
regarding the nature of sexual orientation. Schacter. supra note 54, at 1919. Again. Rubenstein heeded
Schacter's call and included in the second edition readings from Manha Nussbaum, Mary McIntosh. Michel
Foucault, and Judith Butler that he identifies as "Philosophy" and "Queer Theory." See RUBENsTEN. supra
note 2, at 122-44. To be sure, these materials, raising complex and difficult questions, take up only 20
pages of the chapter entitled "Basic Documents." I suspect they would be more accessible and
pedagogically useful were they integrated into the discussion of particular legal problems.
56. RUBENSTEtN, supra note 2, at v.
57. Schacter, supra note 54, at 1915.
1997] 2669
The Yale Law Journal
follow. However, by calling them basic, Rubenstein leaves the impression that
these documents-which include both fictional and nonfictional essays, amicus
briefs, news articles, and academic studies-reflect a snapshot of background
materials necessary to understand gay men, lesbians, and the law. It is unclear
why these materials were determined significant enough to be considered basic,
and why other materials were ruled out. They admittedly provide a nice, albeit
brief, introduction to the history of the gay rights movement, including the
coercive treatment of gay people by institutions such as the church and the
psychiatric profession; but as a substitute for an introductory course in lesbian
and gay studies and as a framing device, the first chapter provides an
unnecessarily partial account of the fundamental aspects of lesbian and gay
lives by focusing the reader on gay men. For instance, most of the material
Rubenstein includes in the first section, entitled "Sexuality," describes gay
male sexuality. Lesbians are the subject of less than a quarter of the material
in this section, and what is included is dated-for instance, Alfred Kinsey's
uniformly discredited observations that women exhibit same-sex sexual
behavior much less frequently than men do,5" and Marilyn Frye's essay,
Lesbian 'Sex', which advances the dubious notion that lesbians prefer cuddling
to penetration.59 There is so much good pro-sex writing by lesbians available
these days.6" It is unfortunate that none of it was included in this section.
Five substantive chapters follow Rubenstein's "Basic Documents":
"Sexuality" (focusing on sodomy laws), "Identity" (as expressed in schools,
private associations, or coerced through outing), "The Workplace" (private and
public employment, including a new section on the Equal Protection Clause),
"Coupling" (marriage and legal instruments that replicate marriage rights, such
as guardianships and domestic partner benefits),6 ' and "Parenting." Each of
these chapters provides evidence of the law's coercive treatment of lesbians
and gay men-for instance, sodomy law prosecutions, military discrimination
against homosexuals, and the denial of custodial rights to lesbian and gay
58. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 14-19 (excerpting ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 446-501 (1953)).
59. See id. at 28-33 (excerpting MARILYN FRYE, Lesbian 'Sex', in WILLFUL VIROIN: ESSAYS ON
FEMINISM, 1976-1992, at 109 (1992)).
60. See, e.g., DOROTHY ALLISON, SKIN: TALKING ABOUT SEX, CLASS & LITERATURE (1994); AUDRE
LORDE, ZAMI: A NEW SPELLING OF MY NAME (1982); THE PERSISTENT DESIRE: A FEMME-BUTCH READER
(Joan Nestle ed., 1992); MINNIE BRUCE PRAT'T, REBELLION: ESSAYS 1980-1991 (1991); Amber Hollibaugh,
Desire for the Future: Radical Hope in Passion and Pleasure, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING
FEMALE SEXUALrrY 401 (Carol S. Vance ed., 1984).
61. Curiously, the chapter entitled "Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships" in the first
edition is renamed "Coupling" in the second. Notwithstanding the name change, the first and second edition
cover the same material: gay marriage, domestic partnership, and other legal fictions through which lesbian
and gay men in relationships can gain some of the financial and legal benefits afforded married
heterosexuals. Given the thorough and complex critique of monogamy, marriage, and traditional family
structures that the gay liberation movement has developed, it is unfortunate that Rubenstein chose to rename
the chapter on gay and lesbian relationships "Coupling."
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parents. Rubenstein does a good job of including materials that portray
complex debates within the lesbian and gay community, such as disagreements
over the legitimacy of intergenerational sex, the debate over gay marriage, and
parenting disputes within lesbian or gay male families.
It is an unfortunate reality that the overwhelming majority of plaintiffs in
gay rights cases are white men. Notwithstanding my earlier observations about
the male bias of the "Basic Documents" chapter, Rubenstein does make an
effort to supplement the cases with readings, both legal and nonlegal, written
by or about the many types of people who make up the lesbian and gay
communities. "Basic Documents" includes an interview with James
Baldwin;62 Audre Lorde's Tar Beach63 and Paul Butler's At Least Me and
Rafael Tried' appear in the "Coupling" chapter; and Lorde's Man Child: A
Black Lesbian Feminist's Response65 is included in "Parenting." To the extent
that the lives of gay men and lesbians are generally hidden from and unknown
to heterosexual people, the lives of gay men and lesbians of color are even
more invisible-even within the gay community. Rubenstein's book reflects
a sensitivity to this problem, although it could go further still. The section on
marriage would benefit from the inclusion of writings such as Barbara
Omolade's The Unbroken Circle: A Historical and Contemporary Study of
Black Single Mothers and Their Families,' and the "Parenting" chapter
would be enhanced by Regina Austin's Sapphire Bound!67 or excerpts from
Martha Fineman's The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other
Twentieth Century Tragedies.68
In sum, Rubenstein's book seems to put to rest the first order question: Is
sexual orientation and the law a proper subject of a law book? To the more
difficult second order question-What is the proper object of sexual orientation
and the law? Rubenstein's answer is the lives of gay men and lesbians: "The
organizing principle of the book remains the life experiences of lesbians, gay
men, and bisexuals."6 9 His book makes pedagogical space in the academy for
gay men and lesbians; it "serves as a treatise or 'deskbook' on lesbian/gay
62. See RUBENsTEIN, supra note 2, at 71-78 (exccrpting Richard Goldstein. "Go the Way Your Blood
Beats": An Interview with James Baldwin, in JAMES BALDWIN: THE LEGACY 173 (Quincy Troupe cd..
1989)).
63. See id. at 688-98 (excerpting Audre Lorde, Tar Beach,. i HOME GIRLS. A B.AcK FEHMINIST
ANTHOLOGY 145 (Barbara Smith ed., 1983)).
64. See id. at 699-704 (excerpting Paul Butler, At Least Mfe and Rafael Tried. AURORA. Spnng 1982.
at 17).
65. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 802-08 (exerpting AUDRE LORDE. Alan Ciuld: A Black Lesbian
Feminist's Response, in SIsTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEERcES 72 (1984))
66. Barbara Omolade, The Unbroken Circle: A Historical and Contemporary Study of Black Single
Mothers and Their Families, 3 WIS. WoMEN'S LJ. 239 (1987).
67. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539.
68. MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
69. RUBENSTEiN, supra note 2, at vi (emphasis omitted).
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law., 71 In a curious way, Rubenstein's approach to sexual orientation and the
law relies upon a form of secular humanism similar to that employed by
Holmes in The Common Law.7' Just as the reasonable person is the animating
subject of modem torts doctrine, the gay person centrally animates
Rubenstein's approach to his subject. Rubenstein's casebook reflects a
maturation of the legal discourse about gay men and lesbians, from object of
legal regulation to moral subject who has certain vested natural, legal, political,
and social rights.
The social and political agenda Rubenstein brings to this project thus
creates a rule of recognition that identifies authoritative texts, which with time
may make up the canon in this field. If your subject is the lives of lesbians and
gay men, then the canonical cases are, to name a few, Bowers v. Hardwick,72
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group,73 Romer v.
Evans,74 DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,75 Watkins v.
United States Army,76 Baehr v. Lewin," and Braschi v. Stahl Associates.78
These cases are privileged because they evidence the struggle between the gay
or lesbian subject and legal institutions that seek to deny that subject full civil
rights.
IV. ESKRIDGE AND HUNTER'S SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
Eskridge and Hunter's book raises the specter of a competing conceptual
scheme, one that will potentially assemble a different set of canonical cases
than those selected by Rubenstein. Rather than examining the law's treatment
of the fundamental aspects of lesbian and gay lives, Sexuality, Gender, and the
Law is primarily concerned with readings that illustrate how there is "[a]
mutually constitutive dynamic operat[ing] between sexuality and the state, just
as one operates between the market and the state., 79 Rather than take the
lives of lesbians and gay men as the object of legal analysis, the text
70. Id. at x.
71. HoLMEs, supra note 12.
72. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of Georgia sodomy statute as applied to gay
man).
73. 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995) (finding that private association has First Amendment right to exclude gay
organization from its St. Patrick's Day parade).
74. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (invalidating state constitutional amendment that prohibited state or
localities from enacting laws forbidding sexual orientation-based discrimination).
75. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation-based
discrimination).
76. 875 E2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (ordering reinstatement of gay member of U.S. Army on equitable
estoppel grounds).
77. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (finding that prohibition of gay marriage is presumptively
unconstitutional under Hawaiian constitutional provision barring sex-based discrimination).
78. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (allowing surviving gay partner of leaseholder to inherit tenancy as
family member).
79. ESKRIInE & HUNTER, supra note 3, at v.
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consider[s] "sexuality" in its broadest sense. One enterprise ... is the
deconstruction and analysis of sexual identity, and we do not limit
that to gay, lesbian, and bisexual identities. We explore how the law
constructs homosexuality and heterosexuality in diacritical relationship
to each other.... [so as] to render visible the lives of lesbians and
gay men, who are often invisible in the law, and at the same time to
analyze the social meanings of heterosexuality, which is often
unquestioned in the law. 0
Recognizing the dynamic relationship that a casebook can have within the
development of a field, Eskridge and Hunter openly confess their aspiration:
"We hope that this book will help shape the field itself."'" But what is their
field? Is it the same field Rubenstein's book seeks to capture? Rather than
focus upon the multiple ways in which the law interferes with or fails to take
account of the lives of lesbians and gay men, Eskridge and Hunter seek to
show how the law's regulation of sexuality permeates all facets of public and
private life, and indeed, produces a coherent boundary between the public and
the private spheres. For these authors, law is a regulatory practice that has the
power to create lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and heterosexual
subjects.
As the title indicates, however, the book does not limit its focus to
sexuality alone. The authors are committed to exploring the degree to which
sexual norms and gender norms cannot be fully understood independent of one
another: "[W]e view sexuality and gender in intellectual terms as so
inextricably linked as to cast doubt on the ability to separate them completely
and still attain a thorough understanding of either."8 - To this end, they
include readings from natural law theorists such as John Finnis,83 materialists
such as Richard Posner,' and feminist deconstructionists such as Judith
Butler 85 and Eve Sedgwick.86 One of the strengths of this text is the manner
in which these difficult theoretical readings are paired with cases that ground
abstract insights from cultural and gender studies in real life problems.
7
Although Eskridge and Hunter do not start off with a chapter entitled
"Basic Documents," it would have looked quite different from Rubenstein's
80. Id. at vii-viii.
81. Id. at v.
82. Id. at vii.
83. See id. at 230-32 (excerpting John M. Finnis, Law. Morality and "Sexual Orzentation". 69 NOTRE
DAmE L. REv. 1049, 1063-69 (1994)).
84. See id. at 241-44 (excerpting RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REAsON 146-47, 157-59. 174-78
(1992)).
85. See id. at 280-82 (excerpting JUDITH BUTLER. GENDER TROUBLE: FEDtIsNI AIND TE SUBVERSION
OF IDENTITY 6-7, 22-23, 24-25 (1990)).
86. See id. at 289-300 (excerpting EVE KOSOFSKY SEDOWICK. EPISTEIOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 67-68.
71-76, 78-90 (1990)).
87. These materials, particularly Butler and Sedgwick, ar hard going for most law students Indeed.
after several attempts, I have given up trying to teach Butler.
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had they done so. Their basic documents would touch on fundamentals of
privacy doctrine; sex discrimination; scientific and cultural theories of sexual
identity; First Amendment treatment of sexual speech, association, coming out,
and the problem of conflicting norms about homosexuality under the religion
clauses; and the law's construction of consent in an array of sexual contexts.
Instead, the Eskridge-Hunter text is organized within three clusters of four
chapters each, covering a wide array of topics that all generally fall within the
domain of sexuality. The first cluster provides constitutional, historical, and
theoretical materials; it emphasizes theories of privacy and equality, the
medicalization of sexuality, and competing philosophical visions of sexual
identity.88 Recall that Rubenstein includes the Kinsey study of lesbian
sexuality in his "Basic Documents."8 9 Eskridge and Hunter, however, discuss
Kinsey in a chapter entitled "Medicalization of Sex, Gender, and Sexuality."9
In so doing, they better situate Kinsey's Sexual Behavior in the Human Female
within the evolving medicalization of sexuality that began with sexologists of
the eighteenth century, continued through Freud in the nineteenth, and
concludes with feminist critiques of Freud' and anticlinicians such as
Foucault.92
This first third of the book ends with a chapter entitled "U.S. Military
Exclusions and the Construction of Manhood," in which the authors use the
norm of masculinity in the military as a way of practically illustrating the
intersection of race, sexuality, gender, and sexual orientation. This chapter in
particular provides a salient example of the different approaches the Rubenstein
and Eskridge-Hunter books bring to a common topic. In Rubenstein's section
on the military, he first considers important regulations with regard to sodomy
and homosexuality,93 then excerpts two academic accounts of the subject,94
and concludes with two significant legal challenges to the Pentagon's policies
that exclude gay men and lesbians from military service.95 In contrast,
Eskridge and Hunter situate many of these same materials within a larger
discussion of the military's history of racial segregation and exclusion96 and
the prohibition of women from combat positions.97 In so doing, they render
the subject in terms that implicate both gender- and race-based norms of
88. See id. at vi.
89. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
90. See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 145-48.
91. See, e.g., NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1989).
92. See 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALrY (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
93. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 585-95.
94. See id. at 595-607 (excerpting Judith Hicks Stiehm, The Military Ban on Homosexuals and the
Cyclops Effect, in GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE MILITARY 149 (Wilbur J. Scott & Sandra Carson Stanley
eds., 1994), and POSNER, supra note 84, at 314-23).
95. See id. at 610-41, 650-63 (excerpting Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.
1988), and Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
96. See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 321-41.
97. See id. at 342-65.
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masculinity, rather than framing the matter in merely gay/straight terms, as
Rubenstein does. The latter approach reflects a kind of civil libertarian, equal
access view of the problem, while Eskridge and Hunter are more concerned
with exposing the powerful cultural work done by the military's policies in
shaping modem notions of masculinity.
The second cluster of the Eskridge-Hunter text, beginning with a chapter
entitled "Identity Speech in the Body Politic," examines the role of sexuality
and gender in various aspects of public and political life. Here, the readings
cover First Amendment rights to speak about sexual identity and about sex,
hate speech, outing, and the relationship between sexuality and citizenship.
With respect to this last topic, the materials suggest an interesting connection
for classroom discussion between domestic anti-gay referenda and asylum
petitions made on behalf of women who seek to escape cultural practices such
as female circumcision. 98 If we can understand Romer v. Evans" to stand
for the proposition that a moral majority may not express its disdain for a
minority's sexual practices by disenfranchising that minority, then does this
precedent estop a majority of the western world from expressing its disdain for
African sexual practices by allowing asylum petitions from African women
who object to those practices? In other words, does Romer's mandate of a
norm of tolerance between competing moral views on the domestic level
require the same degree of cross-cultural tolerance when we encounter a
conflict of values on the international level? The inclusion of these materials
by Eskridge and Hunter illustrates the thoughtful and nuanced approach they
bring to the intersection of sex, sexuality, and culture.
Eskridge and Hunter's final cluster is devoted to "sexuality and gender in
daily life."'" These materials cover the role of sexuality in family law
including the right to marry, sexuality in the workplace, a critique of the notion
of consent, and a catch-all chapter entitled "The Body: New Frontiers" that
covers AIDS, transgender issues, and the legal regulation of cross-dressing. It
is unclear why these topics have any more to do with daily life than, say,
coming out, or being prosecuted for engaging in public sex. The readings are
nonetheless interesting and, if connected up to earlier material, they round out
a thorough treatment of the various ways in which law shapes sexual, sex, and
gender identity.
One of the book's shortcomings, expressly acknowledged by the authors,
is its inattention to the relationship between sex, gender, and race. The
disclaimer provided at the end of the introduction... reiterates, in a now
98. See id. at 755-61.
99. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
100. EsKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 3, at vii
101. The authors write:
One shortcoming that we must acknowledge is the insufficient depth to which this book
examines the interrelationship between sexuality and race. we have. we hope. demonstrated
some of the ways that sexuality is racialized and race is sexualized in American law we
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familiar fashion, what has come to be the familiar footnote to Kim Crenshaw's
"intersectionality" article10 2 in almost every article written on feminist
jurisprudence by a white woman. Yet the jurisprudence of equality and identity
have moved beyond the point where all one needs to do is flag for separate
discussion the complex implications of race. The unmarked terms "sexuality"
and "sexual orientation" cannot now, and never could, legitimately denote an
aspect of human identity that transcends or traverses racial locations. 3 We
can, and must, do better. Mary Becker's course at the University of Chicago
on "Critical Race and Lesbian-Gay Legal Theory" represents a laudable and
serious effort to move beyond the phantasm of de-racialized sexuality. In this
course, she provides readings that address the intersectional identities of gay
men and lesbians of color, the sexualization of African and gay Americans,
and the limitations of gay marriage for dismantling sexism and racism, as well
as readings that critique paradigms of formal equality that have been more
successful for white, gay men than for other lesbian and gay peoples.
The Rubenstein book has an internal logic produced by the coherent
narrative of the lesbian/gay subject traversing various sites of legal regulation.
For this reason, students will find that the text makes sense independent of
whatever the instructor might contribute. The Eskridge-Hunter book presents
a more difficult task for both instructor and student. Without a firm hand
setting up each set of readings, guiding class discussions, and drawing
connections between what may appear to the uninitiated to be unrelated topics,
many students may find Sexuality, Gender, and the Law a frustrating
experience. The book tries to do much more than Rubenstein's book and, for
this reason, demands more of those who will use it.
While Rubenstein's book is predominately descriptive in
nature-documenting the legal treatment of lesbians and gay men-the
Eskridge-Hunter book is more normative. Rather than assuming lesbian and
gay subjects, the readings in the latter over and again suggest the regulative
and constitutive power of law to create sexed subjects. Its structure, case
realize, however, that the issue goes much deeper, to the point where, at least in the United
States, meanings of race and sexuality are often mutually dependent. Developing the materials
necessary to fully explore this proposition was simply beyond the abilities of the authors to do
in the time allotted to produce this book. We invite our readers to join the scholarly project of
helping fill that gap.
Id. at viii.
102. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CI. LEGAL F.
139.
103. Thirteen years ago, Hortense Spillers demanded that feminists appreciate that black women's
sexuality and experience of sexism are not identical to those of white women: "With the virtually sole
exception of Calvin Hemton's Sex and Racism in America and less than a handful of very recent texts by
black feminist and lesbian writers, black women are the beached whales of the sexual universe, unvoiced,
misseen, not doing, awaiting their verb." Hortense J. Spillers, Interstices: A Small Drama of Words, in
PLEASURE AND DANGER, supra note 60, at 73, 74 (citation omitted); see also id. at 79 ("Black American
women in the public/critical discourse of feminist thought have no acknowledged sexuality because they
enter the historical stage from quite another angle of entrance from that of Anglo-American women.").
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selection, and commentary reflect a theory of sexuality that is both
problematizing and, for some, problematic in nature. Many people who teach
in this area love Rubenstein's book precisely because gay men and lesbians are
neither an afterthought-as is the case in some texts on women and the law
or feminist jurisprudence-nor are they relegated to the status of exemplar of
some larger theory. Yet others will regard the Eskridge-Hunter treatment as
more successfully framing the central and cutting edge debates in
contemporary queer theory with respect to the nature of sexual identity and the
role of law and culture in the creation of subjects who possess a sexual
orientation. Does this mean I regard the Eskridge-Hunter text as the better
book? Not at all. These two books provide competing accounts of the proper
object of gay and lesbian legal theory, accounts that mirror an ongoing debate
in the field of Women's Studies. It is from this parallel debate that I want to
draw some insights, which will help illuminate the canonical significance of
the Rubenstein and Eskridge-Hunter books.
V. CANON FORMATION IN WOMEN'S STUDIES: THE POWER OF TWO IDEAS
The evolution of the torts canon provides a model of field production in
which one powerful critic, scholar, and jurist was able to impose his view of
the field and vanquish all others. I hope that something different takes place
with respect to the evolution of the field of sexuality and the law. Rather than
having one view prevail, my hope is that the academy, and the law more
generally, can entertain competing canons within one field loosely termed
sexuality and the law. The evolution of the discipline called Women's Studies
provides an alternative model of field and canon creation.
Beginning with the work of Simone de Beauvoir," and as interpreted
by American feminist writers such as Betty Friedan,3 5  Nancy
Chodorow, 106 Susan Brownmiller,'0 7 and Catharine MacKinnon," s a field
known as Women's Studies emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s that
understood its proper object of study to be the lives and experiences of
women. These early Second Wave feminists took on several important political
and theoretical projects. They began by identifying and valorizing the ways in
which women arguably are different from men.0 9 They also sought to
document the many forms of patriarchal power that subordinate women at
home, at work, and on the street. Thus, much of the work of this time was
104. See SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshlcy trans.. 1953)
105. See BErrY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).
106. See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978).
107. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL MEN. WOMEN AND RAPE (1975)
108. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979)
109. See, e.g., CHODOROW, supra note 106 (articulating theory that woman's role as pnmary parent
has significant effect on different cognitive development of male children and female culdren)
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devoted to voicing women's experiences of rape,10 sexual harassment,"'
and domestic violence."
2
The integrity of Women's Studies, as originally defined, came under attack
in the mid- to late 1980s, when the thinking of postmodern continental
philosophers became fashionable. The early writing of Joan Scott,"3 Seyla
Benhabib,1 4 and Gayatri Spivak n 5 among others, provoked a theoretical
rift within the field of Women's Studies that has yet to be resolved. These
writers called into question the metaphysics of the subject as formulated by
enlightenment feminists. It was during this period that "essentialist" became
an epithet--to be charged with advancing essentialism was to have one's work
attacked as naive, outmoded and, to some, counterproductive." Instead,
these feminists questioned the normative function of a fixed female identity
and were more concerned with the ways in which a constellation of social
practices, some of which were patriarchal, produced male and female subjects.
The category "woman" was not something that could merely be asserted and
then valorized; it was, rather, a normative fiction. As such, sexual difference
could not be disaggregated from culture.
This rupture provoked an anguished, and often impatient, cry from some
quarters:
Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been
silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as
subjects rather than as objects of history that just then the concept of
subjecthood becomes problematic? Just when we are forming our own
theories about the world, uncertainty emerges about whether the world
can be theorized. Just when we are talking about the changes we
want, ideas of progress and the possibility of systematically and
rationally organizing human society become dubious and suspect.
Why is it only now that critiques are made of the will to power
inherent in the effort to create theory?"7
Right around the same time, both essentialist and anti-essentialist feminists
launched class and race critiques of Women's Studies, claiming that the object
of study-woman-was in fact a white, middle-class woman who mirrored
110. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 107.
111. See MACKINNON, supra note 108.
112. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE (1982).
113. See JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY (1988).
114. See SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF
CRITICAL THEORY (1986).
115. See GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, IN OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL POLITICS
(1987).
116. See, e.g., Alison M. Jaggar, Sexual Difference and Sexual Equality, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 239, 245 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990).
117. Nancy Hartsock, Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?, in FEMINIsM/POSTMODERNISM 157,
163-64 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
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those individuals who had secured tenured appointments in Women's Studies
departments. Anti-essentialists appropriated these arguments to undermine the
legitimacy of cultural feminists who claimed to be vocalizing a universal
woman's voice. At the same time, essentialists used these critiques to advance
a more diverse identity politics that recognized and validated the experiences
of women of color and low-income women. In the end, both
sides-essentialists and anti-essentialists--called each other racist.' '
The early 1990s saw the field(s) of Women's Studies struggle with a
reconciliation between the defenders of identity politics and those who
regarded it as bankrupt, or at best, a naive or quaint notion. A new critique of
the critique of essentialism evolved that recognized the counterproductivity of
the binarism that the anti-essentialist critique had engendered, and sought to
move the discussion to a new, less polarized discursive space. Several good
books appeared that attempted to move the debate to new terrain, " and
many writers took up a strategy Spivak termed "strategic essentialism":2'2
"[Strategic essentialism entails] consciously choosing to essentialize a
particular community for the purpose of a specific political goal. Strategic
essentialism ideally should be undertaken by the affected community, which
is best situated to undertake the process of selecting the appropriate
circumstances in which to offer cultural information.'' Interestingly
enough, the feminists drawn to "strategic essentialism" are frequently, although
not exclusively, women of color. Joan Williams offered a third way beyond the
binarism: 122 Rather than providing a theory as to whether women are the
same as or different from men, Williams suggested that "sameness and
difference are not arguments about the essential nature of human beings.
Instead, they are questions that stem from the fact that 'neutral' standards
systematically disadvantage outsiders.' ' 3 Our strategy should be to "describe
differences between outsiders and the mainstream in ways that do not reinforce
118. See, e.g., PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER ... THE isPACT OF BLACK WOMEtN
ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA (1984) (arguing that absence of African-American female intellectuals in
academy results in feminist theory that promotes idea of universal female subject that reflects white middle-
class identity of theorists themselves); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 7heory.
42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
119. See, e.g., CONFLICTS IN FF.,iUNtsM (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds.. 1990); FEMINMI
BESIDE ITSELF (Diane Elam & Robyn Wiegman eds., 1995); FE INisT NIOH'GTIARS (Susan Ostrov Wetsser
& Jennifer Fleischner eds., 1994); DtANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKINO (1989).
120. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography. in SELECTED
SUBALTERN STUDIES 3, 13-15 (Ranajit Guha & Gayati Chakravony Spivak eds., 1988).
121. Loti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense". 17 HARV
WoMEN's L.J. 57, 95-96 (1994); see also Kimberle Crenshaw. Mapping the Margins: ilnersectnahly,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241. 1296-99 (1991); Trna
Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Alaster's House. 10 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 21 (1995); Angela P. Hams, Fonard: The Unbearable Lightness ofldennty. 2 AIR-
AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 207, 211 (1995).
122. See Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate- A Post-Modern Pails Beyond
Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296.
123. Id. at 323.
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stereotypes, [while forging] working agreements on the most effective
strategies to pursue in the face of the supposedly 'neutral' standards of a
tradition that disinherits us."'" As Williams acknowledged, her solution was
"tidy in theory but difficult in practice."' 5 But it did have the effect of
dislodging the sameness/difference logjam.
Women's Studies, as a field, is now experiencing a quite interesting
framing moment. The various sides, if I can describe them so grossly, are
speaking to one another in a new way. There are three, although not only
three, possible outcomes of this intramural conversation. First, one side or the
other could win the debate, just as Holmes's vision of a coherent theory of tort
law vanquished once and forever the defenders of the old school, organized
around forms of action, as well as other theorists who structured the field
around types of injuries. This is unlikely, given the problematic nature of the
notion of winning in this context, and the compelling and legitimate investment
each side has in the integrity of its position. On the one hand, the power of the
women's movement resides in identity-based assertions, and Women's Studies
continues to have strong ties to the women's movement. At the same time, no
serious scholar can any longer reject out of hand the insights of
poststructuralist thinking that at a minimum have shifted questions of
subjectivity from the realm of metaphysics to phenomenology, from the fact
of being a woman to the process of becoming one. Given that resolution in the
form of victory for one side is unlikely, the second and more likely alternative
is that Women's Studies will rupture into two distinct fields: the study of
culture in which women remain the proper objects of investigation, and Gender
Studies, a discipline committed to the critique of cultural practices and norms
that are understood as antecedent to the emergence of viable male and female
subjects. Thus understood, "gender is not something we have, but something
that has us."'"
Equally possible, and I believe more desirable, is a third alternative
whereby we keep talking to one another and maintain a creative tension
between identity politics and the politics of identity. At present, it is unclear
what kind of insights will emerge from a discourse that retains a dynamic
investment in the uncertainty and provisionality of identity claims. But with the
death of grand theory, Women's Studies, like all other fields, must develop
new ways of doing theory itself. A synthesis of insights about the
interrelationship between power and the subject holds out the promise of a new
paradigm. In a faculty workshop in which I recently participated, a colleague
offered that the theory of sex discrimination she prefers is one in which
women always win. Even in this postmoder era, outcomes should still
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 501, 574 n.390
(1997).
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count-and count for a lot. The power of a theory still lies not only in critique,
but in what it can do for the lives of subordinated people.
The field of Women's Studies stands at the threshold of a paradigm shift,
in which the category of things that are considered proper objects of study are
not characterized solely by the properties shared by all
members-femaleness-but rather by a system of principles that give meaning
to or make sense of what it means to be a woman.1
2 7
Against this backdrop, the Rubenstein and Eskridge-Hunter casebooks have
appeared. Both attempt to define an emerging field. Both do so in very
different ways. My hope is that the proper subject of this field will not be
defined according to the winner of these two competing visions, but instead
will be made up of a combination of the two. For some time to come, lesbian
and gay law students will want to see themselves mirrored as intact subjects
in law school curricula, and heterosexual students should be made aware that
there are gay people in their midst. Furthermore, given the violence and
discrimination that some gay people qua gay people experience every day, it
remains important that explicitly gay legal organizations such as Lambda Legal
Defense and the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project address the legal
needs of a community defined in the terms of identity politics. This is well
understood by Bill Rubenstein and Nan Hunter, both of whom headed the
ACLU's Project prior to entering academia full-time.
At the same time, "gay politics" needs to be shaken from its roots in
identity politics. The push for gay marriage, as framed by the plaintiffs in the
Hawaii case,'n represents to my mind a short-sighted example of "me too-
ism," reflecting a kind of "institutional domestication [whereby] normalizing
the queer would be, after all, its sad finish."'' 29 To demand entrance into an
institution such as marriage without providing a critique of the meaning of
marriage for both hetero- and homosexuals is not only naive, but dangerous as
either a theoretical project or a political strategy. For this reason, the identity
politics implicit in the Rubenstein text must be informed by the cultural
critique that motivates the Eskridge-Hunter book; at the same time, the critique
127. George Lakoff drew the distinction between a classical view of categorizauon in which categories
are made up of sets defined by common properties shared by all objects within the category, and new
theories of categorization in which "our bodily experience and the way we use imaginative mechanisms
are central to how we construct categories to make sense of experience." GEORGE LAKOFF. WOMEN. FIRE.
AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT TE HtiAN MIND at xii (1987). Lakoff
illustrates how the process by which humans categorize the world is not grounded in the perception of
objective qualities that all members of the category share, but rather is based upon culturally conungcnt
norms that produce similarities and differences. As an example, he cites the category -balan" in the
Australian aboriginal language Dyirbal. Things that are balan include women, fire, and dangerous things.
See id. at 92-96. This kind of categorizing seems incoherent to us, but makes perfect sense within the logic
that underlies Dyirbal.
128. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ci. Dec. 3. 1996)
129. Judith Butler, Against Proper Objects, DIFFERENCES. Summer-Fall 1994. at 1. 21.
1997] 2681
The Yale Law Journal
of identity underlying the Eskridge-Hunter approach cannot lose sight of the
enduring political and personal need to make identity claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Romer v. Evans3 last
May, many members of the gay community jubilantly took to the streets
proclaiming, "This is our Brown!" Particularly after Bowers v. Hardwick,'
we needed a Brown-like judicial recognition of the equality rights of lesbians
and gay men. But Romer is not that case to the extent that the Court refused
to include gay people within a traditional civil rights discourse animated by
suspect classes. Instead, Romer could very well signal the end of the equal
protection jurisprudence grounded in identity politics, of which Brown is the
paradigm example: Discrete and insular minorities deserve special protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment, so the argument used to go.'32 Clearly this
Court is not going to expand the members of the classes termed suspect;
disabled'33 and gay people'34 have been denied such exalted constitutional
status. Nonetheless, Romer opens the door to thinking about the Equal
Protection Clause in a whole new light, one that redirects the equality inquiry
toward practices endorsed or enforced by the state that vilify their objects as
legal strangers.' 35 In this sense, Romer is entirely consistent with a theory of
equality that at once prefers neither of the contested paradigms of identity and
equality framed by Rubenstein and Eskridge-Hunter and draws from both.
Hopefully, in this postidentity era, other victims of state sanctioned bigotry,
such as immigrants and single mothers, will one day rejoice: "This is our
Romer!"
It is high time that books such as the two I review here have found
mainstream legal publishers, for they have long had audiences impatiently
waiting for them to enter the law school classroom. These books appear as part
of the field-formation process, and will play a dynamic role in the creation of
a subject within the law. But it is my hope that these casebooks will play a
different role in the creation of a field, and of a canon, than did James Barr
130. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
131. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
132. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
133. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
134. Romer declined to reach this question, see 116 S. Ct. at 1627, but virtually every federal appellate
court that has decided it has eschewed heightened scrutiny, see, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F3d 446,
454 (7th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); High Tech Cays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990). But see Watkins v. United States
Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1989) (en bane).
135. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 ("A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws.").
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Ames's 1893 torts casebook. 3 6 Rather than answer the Holmes-like call for
a philosophical approach that neatly and rationally unifies an "entire body of
law,"'137 the best effect these texts can have is to frame an ongoing
discussion, such as the one now taking place within Women's Studies, between
those for whom the subject is the place to start and those for whom the subject
is where you end up.
136. See AMES, supra note 22.
137. Book Notice, supra note 11, at 341.
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